



Florida Fair Elections Center • 112 W. New York Ave., Ste. 211
DeLand, FL 32720 • 386-736-8086 • www.ffec.org
FloridaFairElections@yahoo.com

Report of Findings Ballot Inspection, Precinct 248 Miami-Dade's 2008 Presidential Election

By Mary K. Garber, Research Director

On July 30, 2009, FFEC inspected ballots from Miami-Dade's 2008 presidential election, with the aim of determining why the county experienced the highest overvote rate in the state in this race. Muslima Lewis of the ACLU and Carolyn Thompson of the Advancement Project participated in a portion of the ballot inspection.

Our previous research demonstrated that the ES&S intElect DS 200 digital scanner used by Miami-Dade for in-person voting had failed to provide adequate overvote protection as compared to the Premier Accu-Vote OS/OSx and the ES&S Optech.¹ The level of overvoting in Miami-Dade, however, was substantially above even the high levels experienced by other counties using the DS 200. Further examination of the data from Miami-Dade revealed that its minority voters were much likely to overvote than other voters – even though it was clear that minority voters were highly motivated to vote in the presidential race in this election.² The data also showed that majority black precincts with high overvote rates generally had much lower rates of overvoting for early voters than for election day voters (0.24% vs. 3.76%).³

The purpose of this ballot inspection was to determine what caused the excessive overvoting in the first place, why it affected minority voters more than others, and why early voters did better than those on election day.

Ballot Integrity/Chain of Custody Issues

In addition to requesting the ballots, we asked for the seal log to show an unbroken chain of custody for these ballots. We were troubled to discover that no such log exists. Carolina Lopez, who handles public records requests for Miami-Dade, was able to provide a sheet showing the original seal numbers from the ballot bags brought from the precincts, but acknowledged there was no contemporaneous record of the sealing and unsealing of the ballot bags. In addition to

¹ For a complete discussion of the overvote problem in Florida's 2008 presidential election, see Mary K. Garber, "Examining Florida's High Invalid Vote Rate in the 2008 Presidential Election: How Voting System Design Flaws Led to Lost Votes," (DeLand, FL: FFEC, June 23, 2009), http://www.ffec.org/documents/Invalid_Vote_Report_Revised_23June2009.pdf

² Preliminary research indicates that the problems with the DS 200 may have disproportionately affected minority voters in general – not just in Miami-Dade. A report on overvoting and Florida's minority voters in the 2008 election will be forthcoming.

³ For more information about overvoting in Miami-Dade, see Mary K. Garber, "Overvoting in Miami-Dade's 2008 Presidential Election: Fact Sheet," (DeLand, FL: FFEC, July 29, 2009), at <http://www.ffec.org>.

seal numbers, such logs should contain signatures, times, and purpose to memorialize each time ballots are unsealed and sealed. In fact, when Ms. Lopez cut the seals from the boxes for the inspection, we saw no evidence that the numbers from the removed seals were compared to the numbers previously recorded to see if they were the same. We were unable, after the fact, to determine which seal came from which box.

It is essential that the elections office be able to show an unbroken chain of custody on the ballots, not only through certification of the election, but for the entire 22-month retention period so the integrity of the ballots can be assured.

We suggest that Miami-Dade elections staff develop a rigorous procedure for handling ballots, including a seal log that contains the signatures of the person unsealing the box and the witnesses, the time and purpose of the unsealing, and the number of the seal. The same log should then show the signatures of the person re-sealing the ballots, the witness, the time, and the number of the new seal. We further suggest that ballots not be in the custody of a single person at any time. Some counties videotape ballot inspections in order to show that ballots are being properly handled.

The Inspection

Election Day ballots from precinct 248, a majority black precinct, with a large Haitian population, located at the North Central Branch Library, were selected for the inspection the day before. We looked at this precinct because it had the highest overvote rate—5%—on election day (39 of 780 ballots cast). Yet the same precinct had a much lower overvote rate for early voting of 0.25% (2 of 802 ballots cast).⁴ Overvoting among Precinct 248's Election Day voters was 20 times what it was for its early voters.

The Election Day ballots were contained in three cardboard storage boxes, sealed with brown "garbage bag" style seals. As noted earlier, there was no contemporaneous seal log to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the ballots.

The ballot consisted of two-sheets, front and back, for a total of four pages. The presidential race was in the first column of the first page. There were a total of fourteen pairs of candidates for president and vice president, including the write-in slot. (A copy of the ballot is attached as Appendix A to this report.)

Our examination confirmed that there were 780 election day ballots as shown on the county's election results. (EL 30A, with group detail, overvotes and undervotes). There were 39 overvotes listed in this precinct for an overvote rate of 5%.

Of these 39 overvotes, we found that three resulted from an attempt to change the vote and would have counted if the ballots had been inspected for intent. The remaining 36 overvoted ballots had multiple selections in the presidential race. Six overvoters had marked nearly all of the candidates—except McCain. (See Table 1 below.)

⁴ We began inspecting election day ballots from Precinct 108, a majority Hispanic precinct, but were not able to get very far into those in the time allotted. Thus, this report involves only ballots from Precinct 248. We were able to note, however, some of the same problems in 108 as we saw in precinct 248.

Table 1. Overvotes in 2008 Presidential Race, Election Day, Precinct 248, Miami-Dade County

Type of Overvote	Number of Ballots	Intent Discernible?
Changed vote	3	Yes
Selected 2	11	No
Selected 3	10	No
Selected 4	2	No
Selected 5	4	No
Selected 6	1	No
Selected 7	2	No
Selected 8	0	No
Selected 9	0	No
Selected 10	1	No
Selected 11	2	No
Selected 12	1	No
Selected 13	2	No
	39	

Findings

The following evaluation of the ballots is based on our visual inspection of the ballots. Conclusions concerning ballot design and its effects are based on the usability principles and recommendations set forth in the Brennan Center’s report on the usability of voting systems, which summarizes research on this topic.⁵ Generally, we found as follows:

1. **Overvoters knew their choice for president.** For the most part overvoters seemed to know their choice for president – in this case, Barack Obama – and how to fill in the oval next to his name. None of the overvoters made the mistake of marking McCain’s name as well as Obama’s.
2. **Overvoters knew to darken the oval.** Overvoters knew to darken the oval rather than making other types of marks. We saw ballots on which some voters had used check marks and X’s, but overvoters generally did not. They filled in the oval as directed.
3. **These were not “write-in” overvotes.** The overvotes were not the result of marking the oval next to Obama’s name and writing in his name as happened in the 2000 presidential race. The two instances where a voter wrote in Obama’s name as well as darkening the oval beside Obama’s name did not result in an overvote because the voter did not darken the write-in oval. We know this because the overvote count came out correctly without these.

⁵ Lawrence Norden, Jeremy M. Creelan, David Kimball, & Whitney Quesenbery. “The Machinery of Democracy: Usability of Voting Systems,” Voting Rights & Elections Series, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.

4. **Length of the race was confusing.** What became clear to us very quickly was that voters were confused by the length of the presidential race, as well as the obscurity of the minor party candidates. While they knew the two major party candidates, they were not prepared for the numerous other candidates. Thirty of the 36 overvoters with multiple selections seemed to believe that the other candidates were running for one or more different races. It is easy to see why they would not have been aware of these candidates. With the exception of Ralph Nader and Bob Barr, the minor party candidates were virtually unknown to even the best-informed voters. As the presidential race was identical on all ballots in the state, this information helps us understand why the state's voting systems had to contend with so many overvoted ballots. This problem, combined with the inadequate overvote protection on the DS 200, was the likely cause of the excessive overvote rates statewide; however, it does not explain the much higher levels in Miami-Dade.
5. **Instructions were badly located.** The recommended location for voting instructions on a marksense ballot is the upper left-hand corner as most voters are accustomed to reading from left to right and top to bottom.⁶ Instructions placed in other locations may be overlooked or ignored. On this ballot, the general ballot instructions are at the top of the middle column – where it is easy for them to go unnoticed – at least until after the voter has already marked his selections in the presidential race. At the top of the first column instead is a mostly blank box that contains the bar code and printed precinct designation. This could have been placed in the upper right corner or the lower right corner as a large portion of the third column on the first page was blank. A sample ballot from Volusia's 2008 election is attached to show how ballot instructions were located on other ballots. Note that they are located across the top of the ballot and are very prominent so that it is unlikely that voters will miss them.
6. **Necessary information for marking the ballot and correcting mistakes was missing.** Ballot instructions should contain all the necessary information for marking the ballot and for correcting mistakes.⁷ The Miami-Dade ballot instructions tell the voter if he makes a mistake he should review the instructions for correcting his ballot. What instructions? There are none on the ballot. Were other instructions provided separately? If so, this is a poor idea. Complete instructions should be on the ballot itself – not separated from it. Requiring additional actions by the voter always increases the potential for mistakes. Surely this sentence doesn't mean that the voter should insert a ballot into the scanner that he knows is incorrectly marked. That should never happen. The voter should be plainly told to get another ballot if he or she makes a mistake. It is also a good policy to tell the voter *not* to attempt to correct a mistake because his ballot may not count if he does so. Again, the attached sample ballot from Volusia County's 2008 election contains instructions that are clear and informative. Voters are told that if they make a mistake "do not hesitate to ask for another ballot."

⁶ Based on research by David C. Kimball and Martha Kropf, *Ballot Design and Unrecorded Votes on Paper-Based Ballots*, 69 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 508 (2005), <http://www.umsl.edu/~kimball/d/kkpoq05.pdf> as cited in Lawrence Norden, Jeremy M. Creelan, David Kimball, & Whitney Quesenbery. "The Machinery of Democracy: Usability of Voting Systems," *Voting Rights & Elections Series*, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, p. 17.

⁷ "Ballot instructions should warn about the consequences of casting a spoiled ballot and explain how to correct a spoiled ballot (required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002). Norden et al., "Usability of Voting Systems," p. 20.

The Volusia instructions plainly state the possible negative consequences of attempting to erase or cross out mistakes, that is, the vote might not be counted.

The Miami-Dade ballot instructions also fail to give any guidance on voting for write-in candidates. On the Volusia ballot, we see that voters are given instructions in how to vote for candidates whose names are not printed on the ballot – that they must write in the name and darken the oval as well. (Unfortunately, voters are not told that only votes for persons who have previously qualified as write-in candidates will be counted.)

7. **Multiple languages on the same ballot made text denser and print smaller and likely made it more difficult for language-minority voters to locate instructions in their language.** The Miami-Dade ballot featured instructions in three languages – English, Spanish, and Haitian Creole. In the past, Miami-Dade has had separate ballots in these languages. This ballot combined all three languages on a single ballot. For non-English-speakers, the result was a ballot where they had to search for the instructions in their own language – if they were aware that the instructions were there. When it is necessary for voters to extract the information that pertains to them from a mass of text that does not apply or that they cannot understand, then there is an even greater potential for instructions to be ignored or missed. The most egregious examples of this are the instructions for each race. The instruction “Vote for One” is repeated in Spanish and Creole – in a single line above the candidates with only a small slash to mark the end of one and the beginning of the next. The result is that the Spanish and Creole instructions are not immediately evident. Again, we contrast the Miami-Dade ballot with the Volusia ballot where the “Vote for One” instruction is in bold and prominent.

Conclusions

We conclude that Miami-Dade’s extremely high overvote rate was driven by the confluence of a number of factors: (1) a large number of new voters who were as unfamiliar with the ballot and voting process as they were with the technology and who needed special assistance in order to complete the ballot successfully, (2) a poorly designed ballot that compounded the problem by giving these voters little guidance on how to mark their ballots and what to do about mistakes, and (3) a voting system that provided inadequate protection against such errors. It is also likely that the language differences exacerbated these problems.

Despite the obvious lack of knowledge and experience among the precinct 248 overvoters, it is important to remember that early voters from this precinct did vastly better than their election day counterparts. Even more surprising is the fact that early voters in these precincts had an overvote rate *better* than the overall average for all Miami-Dade voters. Thus, we must conclude that the problems with the poorly designed ballot and inadequate overvote protection were substantially mitigated by circumstances at early voting. What were the differences? We can’t say for sure without more research. It is possible that demographic differences between early voters and election day voters (such as age, language proficiency, etc.) accounted for a portion of the difference, but it is likely that the most important difference was the presence of knowledgeable, highly motivated election officials, aided by a large contingent of partisan poll watchers, attorneys, and election protection activists.

Overvote protection is vital to prevent mismarked ballots from being discarded without giving voters a chance to correct their mistakes. When errors are inadvertent, this notice is all that is required. But if voters have mismarked their ballot because they do not understand the ballot or the voting process, then the overvote protection is only the first, but vital, step in the process. It warns that there is a problem, but it cannot solve the problem. At that point, there is no substitute for a human being who can answer the voter's questions about the ballot, the voting process, and the voting system—in the language understood by the voter.

Good overvote protection serves another vital function: it tells election officials when the ballot is generating an excessive number of voter errors. If election officials had been aware during early voting about the deficiencies with the ballot, they could have taken measures to mitigate these problems before election day.

It is chilling to note that Miami-Dade—along with the other Florida counties using the DS 200—actually did far better than they might have. They benefited enormously from the Obama campaign's emphasis on early voting. If the distribution of voters by mode of voting had been the same as in previous elections, the number of lost votes would have skyrocketed. In a close election, it is easy to imagine that these overvotes—which disproportionately affected one of the candidates—could easily have made the difference in the outcome of the election, thus setting up an election dispute similar to the 2000 debacle.

Recommendations

The purpose of forensic investigations into election problems is to allow election officials to take remedial actions to prevent future full-scale election disasters. To this end, we recommend that the Miami-Dade supervisor of elections take the following actions, in addition to those recommended in our full report on the overvote problems with the DS 200⁸:

- Improve location and layout of ballot instructions. Make sure that instructions are prominently located so that voters do not ignore or miss them. Get an expert in document design to help select a layout for the instructions that will draw the voters' eye to them and emphasize their importance. Look at how instructions were located on ballots in counties with low overvote rates.
- Reassess whether ballots containing multiple languages are effectively serving language-minority voters. The elections office should conduct research to determine if its higher residual vote rates among minority voters are being driven by the placement of all three languages on a single ballot. The elections office should seek the advice of experts in the design of multiple language signage and instructions about alternative designs. This might allow the elections office to develop a design that incorporates all languages on a single ballot without disadvantaging groups of voters. If this is not possible, we believe it will be necessary to have separate ballots for each language group in order to serve these populations, which we realize would be much more expensive.

⁸ Mary K. Garber, "Examining Florida's High Invalid Vote Rate in the 2008 Presidential Election: How Voting System Design Flaws Led to Lost Votes," (Deland, FL: FFEC, June 23, 2009), http://www.ffc.org/documents/Invalid_Vote_Report_Revised_23June2009.pdf

- Give voters all necessary information for filling out the ballot and correcting mistakes. All information necessary for filling out the ballot should be contained in the instructions, including how to vote for a write-in candidate and what to do if the voter makes a mistake. Also, the instructions should alert the voter that his vote may not count if he attempts to correct a mistake rather than getting a new ballot.
- Conduct usability testing on proposed ballot designs prior to their finalization. Testing experts can help elections officials set up and conduct usability tests of ballot designs with target populations to identify problems before they occur. When this isn't feasible, elections officials can ask ballot design experts to review and critique proposed ballot designs.
- Follow the guidelines and standards for usability set out in the EAC's "Voluntary Voting System Standards" and the Brennan Center's report, "The Usability of Voting Systems." The Brennan Center's report summarizes research into the design of optical scan ballots and presents a list of usability principles elections officials should follow based on that research.
- Conduct forensic studies to determine causes of disproportionate vote loss for certain precincts or by mode of voting. The Miami-Dade elections office should conduct research to determine precisely what practices, procedures, training, or other circumstances led to such differential rates of overvoting during election day versus early voting. The findings of that research should inform its future poll worker training and voter education programs.
- Make sure that greater resources are devoted to precincts with large numbers of new voters and voters with special needs to ensure that these voters are not unnecessarily disenfranchised. The difference between the overvote rate among early voters and election day voters in this precinct makes it clear that such an effort would be likely to reduce the number of voter errors significantly.

Appendix A.

First Page, Election Day Ballot, Precinct 248, Miami-Dade's 2008 General Election

ELECTION BALLOT MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA NOVEMBER 4, 2008		DE LAS ELECCIONES GENERALES CONDADO DE MIAMI-DADE, FLORIDA 4 DE NOVIEMBRE DEL 2008		ELECTION BALLOT ELEKSYON JENERAL KONTE MIAMI-DADE, FLORIDA 4 NOVANN 2008	
<p>Precinct 248.0 002 Sheets</p>		<p>TO VOTE, COMPLETELY FILL IN THE OVAL ● NEXT TO YOUR CHOICE. If you make a mistake, review the instructions provided to correct your ballot.</p> <p>PARA VOTAR, LLENE COMPLETAMENTE EL ÓVALO ● JUNTO A SU SELECCIÓN. Si se equivoca, lea las instrucciones que se le dan para corregir su boleta.</p> <p>POU VOTE, RANPLI ANDEDAN OVAL LAN NET ● AKOTE SA W CHWAZI AN. Si w rë yon erë, revize enstriksyon yo sou kouman pou korije bilten vot w an.</p>		<p>NONPARTISAN NO PARTIDISTA SAN PATI POLITIK</p> <p>DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DISTRITO DEL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DISTRIK TRIBINAL DAPÈL</p> <p>Shall Judge Juan Ramirez Jr. of the 3rd District Court of Appeal be retained in office? ¿Deberá retenerse en su cargo al Juez Juan Ramirez Jr. del Tribunal de Apelaciones del 3er Distrito? Èske se pou Jij Juan Ramirez Jr. de 3yèm Distrik Tribinal Dapèl lan rete nan pòs sa a?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> YES/SÍ/VI 82 <input type="radio"/> NO/NO/NON 83</p>	
<p>PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE PREZIDAN AK VIS PREZIDAN</p>		<p>JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT MAGISTRADO DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO JIJ TRIBINAL SIPRÈM</p> <p>Shall Justice Charles T. Wells of the Supreme Court be retained in office? ¿Deberá retenerse en su cargo al Magistrado Charles T. Wells del Tribunal Supremo? Èske se pou Jij Charles T. Wells Tribinal Siprèm lan rete nan pòs sa a?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> YES/SÍ/VI 70 <input type="radio"/> NO/NO/NON 71</p>		<p>DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DISTRITO DEL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DISTRIK TRIBINAL DAPÈL</p> <p>Shall Judge Vance E. Salter of the 3rd District Court of Appeal be retained in office? ¿Deberá retenerse en su cargo al Juez Vance E. Salter del Tribunal de Apelaciones del 3er Distrito? Èske se pou Jij Vance E. Salter de 3yèm Distrik Tribinal Dapèl lan rete nan pòs sa a?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> YES/SÍ/VI 85 <input type="radio"/> NO/NO/NON 86</p>	
<p>PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE PREZIDAN AK VIS PREZIDAN (Vote for One/ Vote por uno/ Vote pou youn)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> John McCain 10 REP Sarah Palin</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Barack Obama 11 DEM Joe Biden</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Gloria La Riva 12 PSL Eugene Puryear</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Chuck Baldwin 13 CPF Darrell Castle</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Gene Amondson 14 PRO Leroy Pletten</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Bob Barr 15 LBT Wayne A. Root</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Thomas Robert Stevens 16 OBJ Aidan Link</p> <p><input type="radio"/> James Harris 17 SWP Alyson Kennedy</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Cynthia McKinney 18 GRE Rosa Clemente</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Alan Keyes 19 AIP Brian Rohrbough</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Ralph Nader 20 ECO Matt Gonzalez</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Brian Moore 21 SPF Stewart Alexander</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Charles Jay 22 BTP John Wayne Smith</p> <p>Write-in Candidate que no aparece en la boleta Ekri non kandida ki pa parèt sou bilten an</p>		<p>DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DISTRITO DEL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DISTRIK TRIBINAL DAPÈL</p> <p>Shall Judge Gerald B. Cope Jr. of the 3rd District Court of Appeal be retained in office? ¿Deberá retenerse en su cargo al Juez Gerald B. Cope Jr. del Tribunal de Apelaciones del 3er Distrito? Èske se pou Jij Gerald B. Cope Jr. de 3yèm Distrik Tribinal Dapèl lan rete nan pòs sa a?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> YES/SÍ/VI 73 <input type="radio"/> NO/NO/NON 74</p>		<p>CIRCUIT JUDGE, 11TH CIRCUIT GRUPO 19 JUEZ DE CIRCUITO, 11NO CIRCUITO GRUPO 19 JIJ AWONDISMAN, 11YÈM AWONDISMAN, GWOUPE 19 (Vote for One/ Vote por uno/ Vote pou youn)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Yvonne Colodny 88 <input type="radio"/> Stephen T. Millan 89</p>	
<p>COUNTY / CONDADO / KONTE</p> <p>CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SECRETARIO DEL TRIBUNAL DEL CIRCUITO GREFYE TRIBINAL AWONDISMAN (Vote for One/ Vote por uno/ Vote pou youn)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Harvey Ruvin DEM 65 <input type="radio"/> Alfredo "Al" Perez NPA 66 <input type="radio"/> Julio Valido NPA 67 <input type="radio"/> Darrin E. McGillis NPA 68</p>		<p>DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DISTRITO DEL TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES DISTRIK TRIBINAL DAPÈL</p> <p>Shall Judge Barbara Lagoa of the 3rd District Court of Appeal be retained in office? ¿Deberá retenerse en su cargo al Juez Barbara Lagoa del Tribunal de Apelaciones del 3er Distrito? Èske se pou Jij Barbara Lagoa de 3yèm Distrik Tribinal Dapèl lan rete nan pòs sa a?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> YES/SÍ/VI 79 <input type="radio"/> NO/NO/NON 80</p>		<p>PROPERTY APPRAISER TASADOR DE INMUEBLES EVALYATE PWOPIYETE (Vote for One/ Vote por uno/ Vote pou youn)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Pedro J. Garcia 91 <input type="radio"/> Eddie Lewis 92 <input type="radio"/> Gwen Margolis 93 <input type="radio"/> Jim Shedd 94</p>	
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Appendix B.

First Page, Sample Election Day Ballot, Volusia County's 2008 General election

<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; padding: 2px;">BS 32</div> SAMPLE BALLOT VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA NOVEMBER 4, 2008		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TO VOTE, COMPLETELY FILL IN THE OVAL <input type="radio"/> NEXT TO YOUR CHOICE. • Use a black or dark blue ballpoint or felt-tipped pen. • If you make a mistake, don't hesitate to ask for a new ballot. If you erase or make other marks, your vote may not count. • To vote for a candidate whose name is not printed on the ballot, <input type="radio"/> in the oval <input type="radio"/>, and write in the candidate's name on the blank line provided for a write-in candidate. 		
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT	NONPARTISAN JUDICIAL	NONPARTISAN COUNTY
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> John McCain Sarah Palin REP <input type="radio"/> Barack Obama Joe Biden DEM <input type="radio"/> Gloria La Riva Eugene Puryear PSJ <input type="radio"/> Chuck Baldwin Darrell Castle CPF <input type="radio"/> Gene Anderson Leroy Fadden PRO <input type="radio"/> Bob Barr Wayne A. Root LBT <input type="radio"/> Thomas Robert Stevens Alden Link OBU <input type="radio"/> James Harris Alyson Kennedy SWP <input type="radio"/> Cynthia McKinney Rosa Clemente GRE <input type="radio"/> Alan Keyes Brian Rothbough AIP <input type="radio"/> Ralph Nader Mick Gonzalez SCO <input type="radio"/> Brian Moore Stewart Alexander SPF <input type="radio"/> Charles Jay John Wayne Smith STP Write-in _____	JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT Shall Justice Charles T. Wells of the Supreme Court be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Shall Judge Kerry L. Evander of the Fifth District Court of Appeal be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Shall Judge C. Alan Lawson of the Fifth District Court of Appeal be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Shall Judge Richard B. Cefinger of the Fifth District Court of Appeal be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Shall Judge William David Palmer of the Fifth District Court of Appeal be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Shall Judge Thomas D. Sawaya of the Fifth District Court of Appeal be retained in office? <input type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO	SHERIFF (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Ben F. Johnson <input type="radio"/> Keith N. Vaughn PROPERTY APPRAISER (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Morgan S. Gilreath, Jr. <input type="radio"/> Ruth M. Zimmerman SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Ann McFall <input type="radio"/> Susan Rose Pynchon VOLUSIA SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT GROUP 1 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Gordon Curtis <input type="radio"/> Mary Frevable VOLUSIA SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT GROUP 4 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> H. Alan Burton <input type="radio"/> Don Kanfer WEST VOLUSIA HOSPITAL AUTHORITY GROUP A, SEAT 1 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> John D. Adams <input type="radio"/> Tracy Lurquist WEST VOLUSIA HOSPITAL AUTHORITY GROUP A, SEAT 2 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Teresa K. Appar <input type="radio"/> William C. Hall
CONGRESSIONAL		
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS DISTRICT 24 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Tom Feeney REP <input type="radio"/> Suzanne M. Kosmas DEM <input type="radio"/> Gaurav Shela NPA		
LEGISLATIVE		
STATE SENATOR DISTRICT 7 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Evelyn Lynn REP <input type="radio"/> Richard Paul Dentonberry NPA		
STATE REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 33 (Vote for One) <input type="radio"/> Sandra "Sandy" Adams REP <input type="radio"/> Robert Acosta DEM <input type="radio"/> Franklin Perez NPA		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; padding: 2px;">Precincts 412C, 418B</div>		
VOTE BOTH SIDES OF BALLOT		
SECRET - See FD 10001		