Voting Systems & Equipment – Florida Fair Elections Coalition

On this page, our readers can access valuable information about voting systems that are either already in use in their location or that are proposed for use. We want to caution the reader, however, that voting systems vary greatly from state to state, depending on certification requirements, updates to equipment, and other factors. For example, Florida does its own testing and certification of voting equipment, and Florida is allowed to add its own software to voting systems as described in the state’s Voting System Standards, which were last updated in 2005.

You can access other relevant reports on the “By Election Year” tab.

Ballot Design Issues

Florida’s 2018 recount of the U.S. Senate race illustrated once again how poor ballot design can change the results of an election. Republican Rick Scott prevailed over Democratic incumbent Bill Nelson by only 10,000 votes; however, in heavily Democratic Broward County, a bad ballot design may have caused tens of thousands of voters to miss the race altogether and perhaps altered the outcome of this election.

Yet the principles of good ballot design are well known. Why weren’t they followed in Broward? Who should be responsible for reviewing and approving ballots? How can we prevent this from happening again?

Broward sample ballot 2018

Better Ballots (2008) Brennan Center

ES&S Digital Scanner 200 (DS200)

2008: Ineffective Overvote Prevention Leads to Massive Increase in Lost Votes

In 2007, FFEC research director, Mary (Kitty) Garber predicted that without modifications, a poorly designed overvote feature on the new scanner would likely result in many more lost votes due to overvoting–a common voter error that the feature is designed to prevent. The feature was not modified, and in 2008, Garber’s fears were realized. In 2008, when the new scanner was first used, the rate of overvoting in the Presidential race increased by a whopping 1,400% compared to 2004. In Miami-Dade, Florida’s most populous county, Garber found the feature had disproportionately affected minority voters. Garber’s research was later used by the Brennan Center for Law and Justice, as well as election integrity activists in Wisconsin, to push for changes to the feature before certification in other states.

Why the New ES&S Digital Scanner Should Not Be Certified

Report of Findings, Ballot Inspection, Precinct 248, Miami-Dade’s 2008 Presidential Election

Overvoting in Miami-Dade’s 2008 Presidential Election: Factsheet

An Examination of Overvoting in Majority-Minority Precincts, St. Lucie County, Florida, in the 2008 Presidential Election

Examining Florida’s High Invalid Vote Rate in the 2008 General Election: How Voting System Design Flaws Led to Lost Votes, published June 2009

2022

Will the governor’s race again be marred by excessive overvoting on the DS200? Our report published just prior to the election looks at how ballot design and an ineffective overvote feature have continued to generate high rates of overvoting–that is, lost votes–in Florida ‘s Presidential and Gubernatorial races.

Florida’s Overvote Problem, Revised October 31, 2022

ES&S iVotronic

In the 2006 general election, problems with the state’s most widely used touchscreen voting machine–the ES&S iVotronic–ultimately led in-coming Governor Charlie Crist to make it his first priority to mandate the use of optically scanned paper ballots throughout the state.

Sarasota’s Vanished Votes: An Investigation into the Cause of Uncounted Votes in the Congressional District 13 Race in Sarasota County, Florida (January 2008)

LostVotes in Florida’s 2006 General Election: A Look at Extraordinary Undervote Rates on the ES&S iVotronic,_Part_1 (2007)

LostVotes in Florida’s 2006 Election: An Investigation into Excessive Undervote Rates on the iVotronic in the Attorney General’s Race,_Part_2 )January 2008)

Assessing Voting System Accuracy (December 2008)